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Civil Rights and
Republican
Principles; a Reply
to the Grahan1
"Incoherence"
Thesis

Professor Sallyanne Payton began her academic career at
Michigan in 1976. She formerly served on the White House
Domestic Council staff and was chief counsel to the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration in the U.S.
Department of Transportation.
SALLYANNE
~

PAYTON

am grateful for an opportunity to
respond to Professor Graham's
very stimulating and informative
paper. Professor ~raham's cent~al insight, as I understand it, is that the
Nixon administration's civil rights policy.was characterized by theoretical
inconsistency and some political opportunism. The "policy'' included a federal
commitment to enforcing affirmative
action, at the same time that it included
the encouragement of a constitutional
amendment against busing. It included

both a vigorous effort to help Sou them school districts
dismantle their dual schools systems and opposition to
legislation that would have vested cease-and-desist
enforcement powers in the EEOC. The Nixon administration created the Office of Minority Business Enterprise while attempting to weaken the Voting Rights
Act. There was the Philadelphia Plan, but at the same
time President Nixon made two attempts to place a
Southern conservative on the Supreme Court of the
United States. On balance, the record cannot be characterized as "liberal," but neither can it be thought of as
''conservative," certainly not in the sense in which the
nation has experienced a purer conservatism under the
Reagan administration. Professor Graham argues that
the Nixon record is, taken as a whole, "incoherent/'
and that what Nixon administration officials lacked
was "an enunciation of Republican principles to
guide their policies."
By way of introduction, I should say that I am a
lawyer, and now a law professor. I came from private
practice to John Ehrlichman's domestic council staff in
April 1971, and served as staff assistant to the president
for two years, after which I moved to the Department
of Transportation. I was not at the time and have never
been a civil rights professional, and civil rights policy
was never in my portfolio. However, as one of the two
Blacks on the White House staff at the time (Bob Brown
being the other) I did have both the opportunity and , I
thought,, the obligation to understand what was going
on in civil rights., and I participated in the women's
movement as one of the Republican women so involved.
It is as an interested inside bystander rather than as a
participant, therefore, that I respond to Mr. Graham's
paper.
Mr. Graham has discovered the eternal truth that
events that seem from afar to be planned systematically
frequently appear from a closer distance to be random.
The latter impression may be as misleading as the former, however, because the pattern of action that one
actually observes, and the principles that have guided
the actors' selection of alternatives, may be based in
unspoken assumptions and implicit world views. A
coherent pattern can emerge from discrete actions even
though the actors appear to be unaware of the pattern
they are creating. I do not propose to argue with Professor Graham's data, only to suggest another way of
describing the pattern.
Professor Grahams thesis seems to have been stimulated by his surprise that the Nixon civil rights policy
was not as wholly unsatisfactory as he expected to find
it. He suggests that what surprised him about the information that he reviewed was the ✓,incoherence" of the
Nixon administration's civil rights policy. He thereby
suggests both that coherence is possible and that incoherence is a deficiency, the implication being that
coherent policy, had it existed, would have yielded better results. There is a backhanded compliment here: the
implicit premise is that the Nixon administration's Republican principles were so successful in other domestic
areas that if they had been applied to civil rights , or if
the administration had tried to develop Republican
principles for civil rights, the results would have been

more satisfactory, from Professor Graham's point of
view, than the actual course of incoherent events. I am
doubtful on that very point. I suspect that civil rights
was in the early 1970s, and still is in the late 1980s, the
great unmanageable item on the American political
agenda, the great policy failure that poisons the nation.
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ndeed, to call the problem one of
"civil rights.,, is to confuse the issue. The problem, indeed, is how
to name the problem. By the time the
Nixon administration domestic policy
team began to tum its attention to civil
rights policy it had already become
clear that "civil rights" in the classic
legal sense of the term was only a frag1nent of the issues over which the ''civil
rights" struggle was being waged.
The deprivation of "civil rights" has been accompanied
by and has been emblematic of a broad spectrum of
deprivations visited historically upon Black America:
slavery, segregation, discrimination, and now nearly
complete social isolation, which have left an aggregate
legacy of depression that is proving extremely difficult
to counteract.
By the time the Nixon administration took office,
there was a political consensus that racial distinctions
ought to be eliminated from American law, a process
that was occurring partly through judicial order in
the wake of Brown v. Board of Education and partly
through voluntary action on the part of legislatures
and executive branches throughout the federal system.
In addition,, the Congress had in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 decided that discrimination against Blacks
and .other minorities in private employment ought
be eliminated as well.
It was apparent, however, that something more
needed to be done, something that Professor Graham
thinks ought to have been done pursuant to Republican
principles. Just in order to get a sense of the difficulty of
that undertaking, let us return to the intellectual scenes
of what Mr. Graham identifies as the great policy triumphs of the Nixon administration. If we look closely,
we will see that they were all based on an appreciation
of structure and principle. In foreign affairs, Mr. Nixon
had a clear understanding of the structure of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, a
conflict aptly dubbed by observers a /ichess game." The
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game is structured by geography and the determinants
of domination such as access to resources, ability to
deny the enemy access to resources, control of the governments of other countries, and so forth. The game
can be taught. Likewise in domestic policy the achievement of the Nixon-style New Federalism, with block
grants, revenue sharing, regional planning, and the
like, was based on the principles of efficiency in the
collection and expenditure of resources:_ centralized
collection and decentralized administration, with the
appropriate scale of the decentralized unit depending
on the task to be performed. There are a small number
of mutually consistent principles that were at the base
of most of the Nixon administration's initiatives in
restructuring domestic government. For Republican
reformers, in general, good governmental structure and process are good government, and there are
things that government ought to do.

W

hat is the structure of
the larger problem of overcoming the legacy of
slavery and segregation? To dismantle
de jure segregation and restore political

participation rights in the South would be part of any
agenda, because the legal subordination of an entire
race was indisputably contrary to every articulate principle of American government. Once white supremacy
had been rejected as a principle, formal legal equality
must follow, again in principle. This principle yields frequently to the contemplation of the electoral calculus,
but the principle is clear, in principle. President Johnson
had gone a long way toward making the laws of the nation reflect these principles. The Civil Rights Act and
the Voting Rights Act had the effect of taking down the
"white only'' signs all over America, the markers of the
official racial caste boundary.
By the time Mr. Nixon took office those signs were
down, though the memories of them were still fresh,
and the nation had discovered that it had larger problems that had been obscured by the obvious one. The
"white only'' sign might come down from the door, but
it was still in the mind. And race was class, the latter
being a much more powerful marker of persons than
is simple pigmentation. The problem of class became
obvious in the 1970s and revealed that the integration strategy that had fueled so much of the civil
rights movement was unrealistic. Races can be integrated more easily than classes, and it is extremely
difficult to force integration across both race and class
lines. The recent suburban flight of middle-class Blacks
is simply one more demonstration of the point. Something must be done, however, about the plight of the
poor, which even in 1970 was clearly worsening.
42

In the midst of this, it would not have required
much perspicacity to have known that one did not
know what to do. The behavior of the Nixon administration is largely consistent with this simple insight.
Some of the actions that had- been designed under
the old schema were helpful and needed only to be intensified, such as increasing the enforcement of antidiscrimination policy and helping the moderates in the
South to retain control of school desegregation. Accordingly, discrimination that had moved underground
was attacked with the new weapon of "affirmative
action," which is essentially a management tool designed to flush out unconscious and surreptitious discrimination, and school desegregation was supported.
But at the same time the pathologies of the ghetto
could be seen to worsen, and that was where the
heart of the problem was. No one knew what to do
about the ghetto.
Meanwhile, the environment in which any thinking
had to occur was not conducive to sustained contemplation. America was undergoing general cultural
upheaval, of which the change in the pattern of relations between the races was a central, even emblematic,
part. From the vantage point of 1987 it may be difficult
to remember the general din of the early 1970s. Recall
Black power, busing, the arguments over the proper role
of whites in the civil rights movement, the welfare
rights movement, and other manifestations of the
times. Meanwhile, white America was in the throes of
the counterculture and the anti-war movements. The
children of the white upper middle class were in the
streets protesting the war in Vietnam, when they were
not listening to rock music, experimenting with alternative living arrangements, and definitely not just saying
no. Kent State happened in the spring of 1971.
Now if the Nixon administration had attempted to
formulate "coherent" civil rights policy in accordance
with Republican principles in this environment, to
whom might it have turned for advice? The Southern
whites who thought they knew the problem best and to
whom the nation had traditionally turned for insight
were the problem itself; for the first time the Blacks who
were experiencing and thinking about the problem
were being heard, but they had had no recent reason
to admire or adopt Republican principles. Mr. Nixon,
however, was a Republican, and there was a limit to his
ability to continue to do things that made him look like
a Democrat, or a secret Democrat. In fact, it is worth observing that the rightward shift of the Republican party
in the late 1970s was stimulated greatly by conservatives' observation of the centrist tendencies of the
Nixon administration.
In any event, the late 1960s and early 1970s were not
the times in which cool masters of government structure such as Fred Malek and Larry Lynn could have
put together a Republican design for civil rights policy.
Race being an issue sui generis in American life, civil
rights enforcement was not regarded as an aspect of
ordinary administration. Civil rights enforcement is a
moral imperative in the form of government. The civil
rights laws are intended to eradicate discrimination,
not to regulate it. Mr. Graham is astute in pointing out

that the Nixon administration never developed a coherent theory of the use of regulatory power in civil rights
enforcement. 1 Where I differ with Professor Graham is
in thinking that this was just as well, in light of the fact
that the moral underpinnings of the civil rights laws are
so different from the moral underpinnings of, say, the
Interstate Commerce Act.
Professor Graham seems to be saying, however, that
the Nixon administration was also incoherent within
civil rights policy, and he makes a convincing case. The
reasons for this incoherence are not so difficult to discern. Mr. Nixon was elected on a tide of reaction. There
was a good deal of space to the political right of him
that he might have occupied, but did not, although he
did make noises soothing to conservatives who needed
to believe that people who agreed with them were back
in control. Mr. Nixon himself was not, however, a man
of the Right; nor was he a Southern agrarian segregationist; nor was he a man whose sense of his own merit
rested on his skin privilege or his control of private
property. He was, if it does not seem old-fashioned to
say it, a real conservative, the kind of conservative who
sees inevitable change and tries to create structures to
contain new energies and to accommodate them in
ways that augment rather than undermine the civil order. Mr. Nixon and his principal men were centrists.
They had come not to dismantle government but to rationalize it, to restore a balance between national and
state power after the unbalancing actions of the Kennedy and Johnson years. Insofar as they could deal at
all with civil rights policy, their inclination was to consolidate the gains of the civil rights movement and to
legitimize them by institutionalizing them.
I suggest, therefore, that we start from the premise
that the people in the upper ranges of the Nixon administration were at heart centrists who were interested
principally in the design of government, and that they
had a sense that something had to be done for civil
rights but were confused as to what was best under all
the circumstances, which included their interest in the
re-election of their leader. I suggest that we look at Mr.
Graham's data not to denounce what it reveals as "incoherent" but to think about what it may actually reveal.
My assumption here is that an intelligent person
tries to optimize subject to constraints; my further
observation is that the Nixon administration officials
operating in the domestic arena were intelligent and
thoughtful, were conventionally competent professionals, and shared a core set of values and assumptions about what kind of government was likely in the
long run to conduce to the happiness of the nation.
Those values and assumptions were the ones that had
worked, by and large, to bring white America to a
state of material success unequalled in the history of
the world. The problem of race, as it looked from this
perspective in the late 60s and early 70s, was how to
get Black America into the system, and to make
the system work for Black America. The Nixon administration was conservative in this important respect:
administration officials did not see the failure of the
system to accommodate Blacks as a fundamental flaw in
the system but as a problem for this particular moment

in history, which it was important not to stretch out
unnecessarily. Hence their endorsement of affirmative
action, which can be understood as an effort to speed
up the integration process, to reduce the Black community's frustration and to skip a generation in terms of
making opportunities available and making certain that
minorities took advantage of them. The solution lay,
Nixon officials thought, in getting more Black people to
behave like whites - to get into business, go to school,
become homeowners, and so on. What worked for
whites ought to work for Blacks, if the Blacks were willing to do what the whites had done and if the whites
could be persuaded to treat the Blacks the same way
they treated whites. This was the world in 1971.

H

owever, civil rights enforcement was not the priority of
the Nixon administration.
What was most important was to deal
with government structure, as Mr.
Graham points out, and the structure
was to be dealt with by the application
to late twentieth-century government
classic Republican principles, on the understanding that
the existence of a substantial federal government was a
fact to be accommodated. That is to say, the Nixon administration's ideas about government acknowledged
the existence, utility and vast potential power of the
federal government and sought to direct that power
into activities that a powerful national government was
uniquely suited to carry out, such as civil rights enforcement and environmental protection; conversely, the
effort was to prevent the federal government from competing with state and local governments to provide
services that could better be provided at the state and
local level. All this was in accordance with classic Republican principles of government, which the Nixon
administration was trying to update to accommodate
the historical fact of the increasing influence of the
federal government.
The principles themselves are familiar, but it may be
helpful to review them as a prelude to the rest of this
discussion. First is the principle of limited government,
the idea that private ordering through the private and
voluntary sectors is in general preferable to the use of
government power. The second is federalism, the idea
that politically responsible local governments are the
primary organs of government and the indispensable
locus of genuine popular self-government. If government must be used, state and local governments are
systematically to be preferred to federal action. The
third principle is the separation of powers, which is a
technique of distributing the powers of government
43

among the branches in order to reduce the threat posed
by the concentration of all government powers in the
same individuals. Programs that are consistent with
these principles may be good; programs that are inconsistent with them are surely bad in the absence of
extraordinary justification. We might add here a fourth
principle, which is that the laws and government structure ought to reflect in general the preferences of the
majority.

T

he civil rights problem posed a
dilemma for believers in these
principles: it was fairly clear that
the only civil rights policies tnat promised to be effective were in tension with
the principles, and the policies t_hat
might be indisputably consistent with the principles
were likely to be ineffective. The reason is that the principles assume as a matter of fact that individuals are
better served when decision-making is lodged in the
private sector or in small government "close to the people." While those assumptions may be dubious for
most Americans, they are flatly contrary to fact for most
-Black Americans. The private sector is the setting for
private racial discrimination; and state and local governments were the enforcers of official segregation.
Moreover, the whites held the majorities in the legislatures so it was to the courts, not the legislatures, that
Black Americans had to turn for justice. In order to
build effective civil rights enforcement programs it was
necessary to discard the assumptions on which much
American government rested. In fact, civil rights enforcement threatened to provide a setting in which the
strength of the principles might be broken forever: since
discrimination was pervasive, so was the potential
reach of federal judicial and regulatory authority, and it
was reasonable for traditionalists to fear that regulatory
programs and judicial doctrines designed to bring
about effective civil rights enforcement might become
models for other types of regulation and judicial intervention that did not start from such moral imperatives.
This was not an idle fear: the vocabulary of "rights" expanded drastically during the 1960s and 1970s, and any
of a number of movements claimed to be as important
as civil rights or claimed that their beneficiaries were
as oppressed as were Black people.
If vigorous, conspicuous civil rights enforcement
can always be expected to raise the anxieties if not the
hackles of persons of Republican temperament and
principles, it is wholly unrealistic to expect a Republican president to be a crusader for civil rights even
where the moral issues are clear. By the time Mr. Nixon
took office, ambiguities had already set in. The pure
"civil rights" issue, conceptually the easiest for Republicans, had in the main already been dealt with
legislatively during the Johnson administration. Iron44

ically, Mr. Nixon inherited not only the hard issues, but
the issues that were hardest specifically for Republicans. What were those issues? By the late 60s and early
70s it was becoming clear that the demoralization of the
Black family had a great deal to do with the fact that
simply removing the racial caste barriers in American
society would not bring about a great surge toward material success on the part of many Blacks. This fact was
understandably embarassing to the Black community,
and there was a good deal of heated discussion about
who was to blame, but the fact could not be avoided.
Indeed, over time the situation has grown more
pronounced.
Republican principles assume that the basic social
unit is the family, the individual members of which
strive for personal advancement. The theory of racial
uplift through the personal mobility of individuals,
however, is based squarely in the assumption that the
unit to be uplifted is an intact nuclear family with an
employed or employable male head of household and
an obedient and supportive female at home who runs
the household and takes care of the children. All of the
Republican assumptions about the appropriate division
of function between the public and private sectors,
about the amount of time the adults in a family can
devote to making money, about labor mobility, about
political participation, and a host of other matters,
assume (implicitly, for the most part) a male head of
household. The entire liberal democratic idea of promoting equality by promoting opportunity was designed to
allow men to achieve equality with one another; the
core of civil rights policy has been to allow Black men to
achieve the same economic and political status as white
men. On this there has been bipartisan consensus.
Democrats have differed from Republicans chiefly in
being more comfortable with maintaining a large population of women and children on welfare. The subtext of
much policy toward the Black community, however, has
been to place Black males in a position to direct their
families and contribute their resources to them in the
same way that white males are presumed to contribute.
The flaw in this approach has been that the nuclear
family structure within the white community itself has
been coming under pressure. In the 60s and 70s it was
obvious to anyone willing to look that the problems of
the Black community were not to be solved by cultivating patriarchy. But what else was there? The answer to
that problem was not clear in the early 70s and is not
clear now. What is clear is that a family unit cannot subsist on the income realistically available to an unskilled
woman worker with children whose opportunities are
limited by the gender segregation of the workplace.
One can attack the problem directly, or one can tell the
woman to find (or keep) a man and get his money. The
thinking of much of the civil rights community has run
along the latter lines, which are, ironically, consistent
with Republican principles that contemplate the dependence of females and children on adult males. Even in
the late 80s conferences on "civil rights" rarely devote
much time to discussing the status of women, though
the female-headed household is now a prevalent form
of family organization in the Black community.
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f one wants to deal with the structural problem that confronts Black
America, one must deal with the
status of Black women and through that
window with the problem of Black children, which is where the future
lies. I cannot fault Mr. Nixon for not having taken the
lead on this issue, because the women's movement had
just gotten underway and thinking about the status of
women was embryonic. What Mr. Nixon did in fact, being unable to deal with one basic structural problem,
was by no means deplorable, as Mr. Graham points out.
The picture that emerges from Mr. Graham's pa per is of
an administration actually trying to achieve some progress, subject to political constraints and in light of its
determination not to miss its opportunities to make the
GOP the majority party at the presidential level. There
was, predictably, a great deal of symbolic political activity directed at wooing the most discontented whites.
But Mr. Nixon was no counterrevolutionary. Nor was
Mr. Ehrlichman, nor Mr. Schultz. There is no villain in
this piece.
What Graham actually accuses Mr. Nixon of is "incoherence" rather than villainy. The evidence for this is
that Mr. Nixon said very little, never developed an articulate program, allowed the various members of his
administration to go off on projects of their own (e.g.,
Schultz and the Philadelphia Plan), and mainly demanded that they not get him in trouble, that is, that
they should design action so that if there was to be
a reaction it would be directed at another branch of
government, preferably the courts. Meanwhile, in low
visibility areas such as budgets Mr. Nixon beefed up
civil rights agency enforcement resources and helped
the moderate South maintain control during desegregation. And he tried to give some encouragement to the
fledgling class of Black entrepeneurs.
This is not a bad record for a Republican elected on
a wave of reaction. Indeed, some conservatives have
never forgiven Mr. Nixon for having been so sensible. It
is possible to argue that the energy for the expansion of
rights was coming from Democrats, not Republicans,
and that Mr. Nixon did everything he could to keep the
volume down and to retard the pace of change. But he
could have kept the volume a good deal lowe¼ and he
could have been much less supportive of the ultimate
direction of change. What the Nixon administration
actually tried to do was to moderate change, to create
sound government structures to contain the energy that
was flowing, uncontrollably, into government. The administration did not, and this is important, try to stamp
out the energy itself. Working for the administration
was frequently frustrating for those of us who were part
of the energy, but it is hard to fault the Nixon administration for being what it was elected to be, which was
a moderate Republican administration. Indeed, Mr.
Nixon did some things that placed him ahead of his
time, such as the Indian policy put together by Ehrlichman and Bobbie Kilberg. And in the area where policy

was most out of view of the right wing, that being District of Columbia affairs, the president, Mr. Ehrlichman
and Mr. Krogh were consistently supportive of the
Black officials of the District of Columbia government,
poured very impressive amounts of resources into
the jurisdiction, and worked to place the District on a
sound fiscal basis and to achieve home rule. I can say
on the basis of my own experience in managing District
of Columbia affairs that these centrist Republican reformers were a pleasure to work for and with.
In reviewing the entire record of an administration,
it is important to keep in mind that measures that are
not taken as part of an advertised "civil rights" policy
may have a tremendous effect, for good or ill, on Black
Americans. Early in his administration Mr. Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan, which would have
placed basic cash incomes in the hands of poor and
working poor families with children, many of them
female heads of families. The plan would have had a
radical effect on the economic and political structure of
the South. It would have provided a real subsistence
floor for millions of Black children in rural areas. It
would have been a first step toward treating the femaleheaded family as a structure, not an aberration or
pathology, and therefore would have dealt with it
straightforwardly as a problem of wage structure and
work incentives. The FAP died as the result of a coalition of conservatives who understood its implications
and of liberals who did not perceive its beneficiaries,
who would mainly have been poor women and their
children, as their constituency. It is only now that
comprehensive welfare reform is back on the political
agenda, and I fear that it is not yet widely understood
that the status of Black women will ultimately determine the future of Black people in America. I cannot
fault Richard Nixon and his conventional Republican
reformers for having failed in 1971 to appreciate truths
that are only beginni_ng to be perceived.
Lest it sound as though I am arguing that the Nixon
administration did fine on civil rights, all things considered, let me make it clear that my empathy for the
intellectual problems of engineering a civil rights policy
for a Republican administration does not obscure my
dismay at the moral damage done to the civil rights effort during the Nixon years. At the same time that his
executives were doing their sensible best to create a
sound approach to civil rights, the political message
that was going forth from the White House was one of
Southern strategy and conservative Southern appointments to the Supreme Court, of nods and winks. The
Johnson administration had put the moral weight of the
presidency behind the law, and behind the civil rights
movement. The Nixon administration continued and
extended much of the good concrete work. But there
was the moral counterweight, and I am not prepared to
argue that the loss of the moral presence of the presidency on the side of those seeking to break down the
racial caste system was not in the end the most longlasting legacy of the Nixon administration. Perhaps the
most balanced statement that can be made is that the
time for informed judgment has not yet come.
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